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THE HONORABLE JOSEPH F. MURPHY, JR. LEGAL 
WRITING COMPETITION 
WINNING STUDENT COMMENT* 
HOW MARYLAND'S SANCTUARY POLICIES ISOLATE 
FEDERAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION WHILE 
UNDERMINING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
By: Douglas R. Sahmel 
After the September 11, 2001 ("9/11") terrorist attacks, some have 
clamored for greater involvement from local police in immigration law 
enforcement, largely on the ground that immigration reform is critical 
to homeland security. I 
A debate has ensued, however, as to whether state and local law 
enforcement authorities can, or could be required to, enforce federal 
immigration laws? Within this debate, two notable trends are: (1) 
efforts by the White House and Congress to expand the role of local 
police to voluntarily enforce federal immigration law3; and (2) the 
resurgence of state and city "sanctuary" policies opposed to such a 
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Section in 2006. Publication in The University of Baltimore Law Forum was one of the 
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Lisa M. Seghetti, Stephen R. Viiia, and Karma Ester, Enforcing Immigration Law: The 
Role of State and Local Law Enforcement, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE I (Oct. 
13, 2005) (Order Code RL32270); Michael M. Hethmon, In The Aftermath Of 
September II: Defending Civil Liberties In The Nation's Capital: The Treatment Of 
Immigrants: THE CHIMERA AND THE COP: LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW, 8 D.C. L. REV. 83 (2004). 
SEGHETTI, supra, note I, at 4. 
Michael 1. Wishnie, 22nd Annual Edward V. Sparer Symposium: Terrorism and the 
Constitution: Civil Liberties in a New America: State and Local Police Enforcement of 
Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004). 
SEGHETTI, supra, note I, "Summary", and at 22-23. 
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such policies in effect in the cities of Baltimore, Takoma Park, and 
Greenbelt, and in Montgomery and Prince George's Counties.s 
Congress squarely took aim at sanctuary policies in two federal 
statutes well before 9111-in 1996-but some localities nationwide 
continue to ignore these laws.6 Several bills pending in the 109th 
Congress would in part undermine these non-cooperation policies and 
clarify that they are violative of federal law.7 In Maryland, the 
General Assembly last session saw heated battles over immigration8-
which is increasingly becoming an election issue-and could see more 
of the same in 2006. Indeed, the results of the coming immigration 
debate on Capitol Hill and in Annapolis could have profound 
implications for Maryland's criminal justice system. 
This essay will argue that Maryland's sanctuary ordinances violate 
both federal law and the U.S. Constitution, while undermining our 
criminal justice system. Part I identifies the problem; Part II discusses 
the need for change; Part III discusses alternatives for addressing the 
problem; and Part IV advocates one or more proposals. 
I. THE PROBLEM: SANCTUARY LAWS' DEFIANCE OF 
FEDERAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CREATES A 
LEGAL FOG THAT UNDERMINES OUR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND SECURITY 
A. Background: The 1996 Laws and Maryland's Contrary Sanctuary 
Ordinances 
Section 642(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act (lIRIRA) of 1996 (8 U.S.C. 1373(a)) provides that, 
"[nJotwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, 
a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not 
prohibit, or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from 
sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization 
5. See Alex Meneses Mivashita, Maryland Communities Protest Patriot Act, Fox News, 
Oct. 13, 2003, http;llwww.foxnews.comlstory/0.2933.99927.00.html(last visited Jan. 
27,2006). 
6. SEGHEITI, supra note I, at note 76. 
7. Andorra Bruno, Ruth Ellen Wasem, Alison Siskin, and Bias Nufiez-Neto, Michael John 
Garcia, Stephen R. Vifia, and Karma Ester, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 
I09th Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 5 (Oct. 17, 2005) (Order Code 
RL33125). 
8. See David Abrams, Security and Hospitality Fuel Immigration Debate, THE CAPITAL 
(Annapolis, MD), March 18,2005. 
2006] Maryland's Sanctuary Policies Isolate Federal Law 151 
Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, 
lawful or unlawful, of any individual.,,9 
Using nearly identical language, Section 434 of the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) 
of 1996 states that, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of Federal, 
State, or local law, no State or local government entity may be 
prohibited, or in any way restricted, from sending to or receiving from 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service information regarding the 
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United 
States."IO 
In sharp contrast to this language, however, Maryland's local 
sanctuary laws expressly impede government employees from 
cooperating and communicating with federal immigration authorities. 
For instance, a 2003 Baltimore City Council resolution--entitled the 
'Preservation of Civil Liberties Resolution - USA Patriot Act'-
directs the Baltimore City Police Department to "[r]efrain from 
enforcing immigration matters, which are entirely the responsibility of 
the Department of Homeland Security." II A Prince George's County 
Council resolution directs "the Chief of Police and each member of the 
Prince George's County Police Department" to "[r]efrain from 
enforcing immigration matters that are the responsibility of the 
Department of Homeland Security.,,12 Resolutions passed by the 
Takoma Park City Council, the Greenbelt City Council, and the 
Montgomery County Council contain analogous language.13 
Proponents of sanctuary laws generally assert that the local 
authority for enacting these directives is grounded in the states' Tenth 
Amendment sovereignty right, and on the view that the "[p]ower to 
9. 8 U.S.C.S. § l373(a) (2005). 
10. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1644 (2005). 
11. Baltimore City Council Resolution 03-1046(1 )(a), American Civil Liberties Union, 
Baltimore, MD City Council Resolution, http://www.aciu.orglsafefree/ 
resources/l 7260res20030519 .html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
12. Prince George's County Council Resolution No. CR-78-2003, American Civil Liberties 
Union, Prince George's County, MD, http://www.aciu.orglsafefree/ 
resources/l 6982res2003 1215 .html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
13. See American Civil Liberties Union, Takoma Park City Council Resolution on Protecting 
Civil Liberties, http://www.aciu.org/safefree/resources/17656res2002l029.html (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2006); Maryland Latino Coalition for Justice, Resolution to Protect Civil 
Liberties in Greenbelt --- presented by Greenbelt Bill of Rights Defense Coalition, 
http://www.latinosinmaryland.org/tool_kitresolutiongreen.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 
2006); American Civil Liberties Union, Montgomery County, MD Resolution, 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/177ll res2003l 00 l.html (last visited Jan. 30, 
2006). 
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regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.,,14 
Sanctuary policy critics, however, maintain that local non-cooperation 
ordinances violate federal law and the Constitution as they are 
preempted by the 1996 statutes under the Supremacy Clause. IS 
B. Non-Cooperation Laws Create A Legal Fog That Undermines 
Criminal Justice And Our Security 
A major problem posed by sanctuary laws' defiance of federal law 
is that they create a legal fog that undermines our criminal justice 
system and security. As a police officer from sanctuary city Houston, 
Texas, told the House Judiciary Committee in 2003: 
When local agencies around the country enact a 
"sanctuary law" type of policy, society at large is 
placed at risk. Sanctuary laws undermine the authority 
and effectiveness of street level officers and completely 
render them ineffective to prevent potential further 
criminal activity. With this type of policy, authorities 
may never know if an individual is in the United States 
illegally and if they could have been removed before 
they had the opportunity to commit a criminal act. 16 
The legal fog and hamstringing of law enforcement that sanctuary 
laws engender present real dangers to not only Marylanders, but to all 
Americans. 
C. Sanctuary Laws' Invalidity 
Sanctuary laws are invalid for three reasons: first, sanctuary 
supporters' Tenth Amendment claim turns federalism on its head 
while violating federal and Constitutional law. Second, the IIRIRA 
and PRWORA provisions are legitimate federal enactments that 
preempt contrary local law under the Supremacy Clause. Third, by 
brazenly violating statutory and Constitutional law and defying 
Congress's will, sanctuary policies are incongruous with both our 
14. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 u.s. 351, 354 (1976). 
15. SEGHElTl, supra note I, at 23. 
16. New York City's 'Sanctuary' Policy and the Effect of Such Policies on Public Safety, Law 
Enforcement, and Immigration, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border 
Security, and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85-287 PDF, I08th Congo 19 
(Feb. 27, 2003) (prepared Statement of John Nickell). 
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general governmental framework, and with the deference traditionally 
given to the federal immigration power. 
(1) Sanctuary Supporters' Tenth Amendment Claim Turns Federalism 
On Its Head To Violate Federal And Constitutional Law 
In order to evade rightful federal preemption, sanctuary supporters 
argue that states and localities have a sovereignty right under the 
Tenth Amendment to not participate in the federal enforcement of 
immigration law. This claim fails because it is inconsistent with basic 
federalism principles and is inapposite where the federal government 
merely invites, rather than requires, local involvement. 
Interestingly, this very issue was litigated before the U.S. Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals in City of New York v. United States. I 7 There, 
a unanimous court struck down New York City's controversial 
sanctuary law and roundly rejected the city's Tenth Amendment 
challenge of federal preemption. The court wrote that this claim "asks 
us to turn the Tenth Amendment's shield against the federal 
government's using state and local governments to enact and 
administer federal programs into a sword allowing states and localities 
to engage in passive resistance that frustrates federal programs.,d8 
Moreover, the Second Circuit explained that states "do not retain 
under the Tenth Amendment an untrammeled right to forbid all 
voluntary cooperation by state or local officials with particular federal 
programs.,tl9 The City of New York rightly asserted that under Printz 
v. United States,20 the Tenth Amendment is a bar to federal 
commandeering of state resources to enforce immigration law.21 
However, as the Second Circuit noted, the Tenth Amendment offers 
no protection when, as here, the federal government invites states to 
enforce federal law. 22 
Sanctuary supporters, then, tum federalism on its head in claiming 
the authority to violate federal law and the Supremacy Clause through 
naked legislative overreach. This power grab reflects a contempt for 
federal authority and Congress's will, as well as an erroneous view of 
17. 179 F.3d 29 (1999). 
18. /d. at 35. 
19. ld. at 36. 
20. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
21. Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws In The Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting 
Local Enforcement Of Immigration Laws Violates The Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REv. 965, 975 (2004). 
22. City of New York, supra note 17, at 36; Pham, supra note 21, at 975. 
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Tenth Amendment sovereignty. However noble its motives or 
convincing the guise of 'federalism,' a local government unmoored 
from superseding law and its constitutional responsibilities could 
cause much chaos, conflict, and confusion indeed. 
(2) Maryland's Sanctuary Laws Are Preempted By Sections 642 
and 434 Under the Supremacy Clause 
IIRIRA § 642(a) and PRWORA § 434 trump contrary local laws 
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.23 Under the 
Supremacy Clause, "[w]henever the constitutional powers of the 
federal government and those of the state come into conflict, the latter 
must yield.,,24 The resultant and overriding "Law of the Land,,25 is "as 
much a part of the law of each State, and as binding upon its 
authorities and people, as its own local constitution and laws. ,,26 
Further, under Article 2 of the Declaration of Rights to the Maryland 
Constitution, 
The Constitution of the United States, and the Laws 
made, or which shall be made, in pursuance thereof, 
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the authority of the United States, are, and shall be the 
Supreme Law of the State; and the Judges of this State, 
and all the People of this State, are, and shall be bound 
thereby; anything in the Constitution or Law of this 
State to the contrary notwithstanding.27 
The determinative question in this Supremacy Clause analysis is 
whether the application of the local law under review "stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress. ,,28 Here, Sections 642 and 434 state that 
localities "may not prohibit, or in any way restrict" employees from 
sharing immigration information with federal authorities. In 1996, 
Congress intended to undermine sanctuary ordinances, facilitate local 
government employees III voluntarily providing immigration 
23. u.s. Const. art. VI, c!. 2. 
24. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17 (1927). 
25. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. 
26. Fanners' & Mechanics' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 35 (1875). 
27. Md. Canst., Dec!. of Rights art. 2. 
28. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941); See Seth P. Waxman and Trevor W. 
Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers, State Criminal Law, and the 
Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2215 (2003); See also, Bradford R. Clark, The 
Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 91, 93 
(2003). 
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infonnation to federal authorities and, more broadly, foster local 
enforcement of immigration law. 29 Legislative history confinns that 
these were Congress's objectives in passing the 1996 provisions. The 
Conference Report to PRWORA states that: 
The conferees intend to give State and local officials 
the authority to communicate with the INS regarding 
the presence, whereabouts, or activities of illegal aliens. 
This provision is designed to prevent any State or local 
law, ordinance, executive order, policy, constitutional 
provision, or decision of any Federal or State court that 
prohibits or in any way restricts any communication 
between State and local officials and the INS. The 
conferees believe that immigration law enforcement is 
as high a priority as other aspects of Federal law 
enforcement, and that illegal aliens do not have the 
right to remain in the United States undetected and 
unapprehended.30 
Support for these Congressional purposes is also found in the fact 
that sanctuary laws have long been a Congressional targee 1 and, as 
some legislation now pending in Congress expressly states, that local 
non-cooperation laws violate Sections 642 and 434. For example, 
Section 4(a) of S. 1362, the Homeland Security Enhancement Act of 
2005, provides that: 
A statute, policy, or practice that prohibits a law 
enforcement officer of a State, or of a political 
subdivision of a State, from enforcing Federal 
immigration laws or from assisting or cooperating with 
Federal immigration law enforcement in the course of 
carrying out the law enforcement duties of the officer 
or from providing infonnation to an official of the 
United States Government regarding the immigration 
status of an individual who is believed to be illegally 
present in the United States is in violation of section 
29. Craig B. Mousin, A Clear View From The Prairie: Harold Washington And The People 
Of Illinois Respond To Federal Encroachment Of Human Rights, 29 S. ILL. U. L. J. 285, 
304-305 (Winter, 2005) (explaining that "Congress sought to counter. .. local [non-
cooperation] responses"). 
30. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-725, at 383 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 
2771. 
31. David Firestone, Giuliani to Sue Over Provision on Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,1996, 
Section B, Page I, Column 5. 
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(a) Maryland's sanctuary laws directly conflict with the 1996 
provisions and are therefore preempted by those federal statutes 
Maryland's sanctuary laws are in direct conflict with Sections 642 
and 434 by requiring local police to "refrain" from the very conduct-
the sharing of immigration information with federal authorities-that 
Congress says localities "may not prohibit, or in any way restrict" 
under Sections 642 and 434. Both the federal and local laws target 
local authorities, but federal law promotes precisely what the local law 
inhibits. In so doing, non-cooperation laws constitute a 'restriction' or 
'prohibition' within the plain meaning of the federal statutory 
prohibitions, and present a blatant 'obstacle' to the goals of the 1996 
laws. Toward this end, some sanctuary ordinances even brashly state 
their disapproval of Congress' goal of local immigration enforcement, 
thus laying bare the fact that they directly oppose the federal 
objectives at issue here. The Montgomery County Council 
Resolution, for instance, opines that: 
[I]n addition to the passage of the Patriot Act, the 
federal government has taken a number of other steps 
in the aftermath of September 11 that threaten to 
undermine the fundamental rights and liberties 
guaranteed by the Constitutions of the State of 
Maryland and the United States, as well as Community 
Policing and other law enforcement strategies designed 
to build trust between the police and communities, such 
as encouraging local law enforcement to enforce 
provisions of federal immigration law that historically 
have been an exclusive province of the federal 
33 government. ... 
This issue, then, is not a case of a federal statute being silent or 
ambiguous, but merely disagreeable to certain local authorities' policy 
and political preferences. States are bound under the Supremacy 
Clause by the entire law of the land, not just to those laws in line with 
32. S. 1362, I09th Congo (2005) (Emphasis added). 
33. Montgomery County Resolution No. 107-56 (2003) (Emphasis added). 
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the policy or political preferences of the local governing majority. 
Local disapproval of certain federal laws, moreover, does not justify 
manifesting that dislike through uncooperative local legislation. 
Further, with respect to sanctuary laws' hindrance of the "full 
purposes and objectives of Congress," some observers argue that non-
cooperation ordinances interfere with the Constitutional objectives of 
the federal government. Under this view, non-cooperation policies 
impede the United States' Constitutionally-conferred "guarantee" to 
protect the states from both "invasion" and "domestic violence" under 
Article IV, § IV?4 When the local police who interact most closely 
with the illegal alien population do not assist the more-removed 
federal authorities, the federal government's ability to protect the 
states is significantly diminished than had that cooperation occurred. 
This sort of impediment, one could argue, is a particularly flagrant 
"obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress. ,,35 
Therefore, as Maryland's sanctuary laws frustrate both the 
Congressional and Constitutional objectives of the federal 
government, they are preempted by the 1996 statutes under the 
Supremacy Clause. 
(3) Sanctuary Laws are Inconsistent with Both Supreme Court 
Precedent and the General Deference Given to the Federal 
Government in Immigration Matters 
(a) Sections 642 and 434 are valid Congressional enactments 
pursuant to the long-recognized federal immigration power 
IIRIRA § 642(a) and PRWORA § 434 are plainly valid enactments 
by Congress pursuant to its long-recognized 'plenary' power over 
immigration matters. 36 The Supreme Court "without exception has 
sustained Congress' 'plenary power to make rules for the admission of 
aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which 
Congress has forbidden.,,,37 Notably, the Court in the 19th century 
34. Bill O'Reilly, Politicians Failing To Protect and Serve, The Sun-Sentinel, Jan. 11,2003, 
at 19A. 
35. HINES, supra note 28, at 67. 
36. See Note, The Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Review for Administrative 
Deportation Decisions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1850, 1851 (1998) (explaining Congress's 
"plenary power in the [immigration] field"). 
37. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (quoting Boutilier v. INS, 386 U.S. 
118, 123 (1967)). 
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struck down various state efforts to regulate immigration-and 
affirmed Congressional authority to do so--in seminal decisions such 
as The Passenger Cases (1849),38 the Head Money Cases (1884),39 
and The Chinese Exclusion Case (1889)40. This precedent helped 
establish Congress's well-settled authority over immigration matters.41 
(b) Sanctuary laws are inconsistent with deference given to the federal 
immigration power. 
Finally, sanctuary laws are inconsistent with the deference 
generally given to the federal government in immigration matters. As 
the Supreme Court explained in Mathews v. Diaz, "[f]or reasons long 
recognized as valid, the responsibility for regulating the relationship 
between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to 
the political branches of the Federal Government. ,,42 When states and 
localities enact their own immigration policies, it contradicts this 
fundamental principle and harkens back to the immigration policies of 
the early American states, which Congress eventually harmonized by 
asserting its national power over immigration.43 
In sum, sanctuary policies violate federal laws, the Constitution, 
and are inconsistent with both our general federal framework and with 
the deference traditionally given to the federal government in 
immigration matters. They find no support in the Constitution, 
statutory law, or Supreme Court precedent, and are antithetical to our 
federalist system. 
II. THE NEED FOR CHANGE 
There is an urgent need to eliminate Maryland's sanctuary laws and 
ensure the uniform enforcement of immigration law in the State. Non-
cooperation policies are unlawful and unconstitutional, undermine law 
enforcement and criminal justice, and imperil our domestic and 
38. 48 U.S. 283 (1849). 
39. 112 U.S. 580 (1884). 
40. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
41. Stephen L. Legomsky, Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy (4th ed. 2005), at 104-
5, 108. 
42. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976). 
43. LEGOMSKY, supra note 41, at 14-15; See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of 
American Immigration Law (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993); see also 
Developments in the Law -- Jobs and Borders, v. The Constitutionality of Immigration 
Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2247,2268 (2005). 
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national security. Moreover, the dangers of these illegitimate policies 
are significantly heightened in the post-9fll era. 
Sanctuary laws hinder the administration of criminal justice by, 
among other things, sowing confusion-and perhaps conflict-among 
local law enforcement, citizens, and noncitizens. Today, immigration 
law in Maryland is enforced differently across various cities and 
counties. This is inconsistent with our fundamental notions of a 
national immigration system and ofa "supreme Law of the Land.,,44 
For example, a Prince George's County police officer, under that 
jurisdiction's sanctuary policy, is barred from sharing immigration 
information with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; his 
counterpart across the county line in Anne Arundel County, however, 
is free to do so. Should that Prince George's County officer wish to 
enforce immigration law in accordance with the 1996 laws, is he 
bound by the local Resolution? Should this officer be punished for 
violating one law, though he followed another? Further, how would a 
highly mobile illegal criminal alien fare in the state's differing 
jurisdictions if, say, local and municipal law enforcement were 
collaborating to apprehend him? 
These and other problems create significant uncertainty for all 
involved, and could conceivably spark conflicts between the State's 
counties and cities. The local governments who brazenly enacted 
sanctuary laws would do well to recall James Madison's Federalist 
No. 10, where he observed: "The instability, injustice, and confusion 
introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal 
diseases under which popular governments have everywhere 
perished. ,,45 
Non-cooperation policies primarily endanger our national security 
by, as the name suggests, requiring that local police refuse to 
cooperate in immigration law enforcement. This audacious flouting of 
federal law-that was passed by elected representatives to promote 
public safety and the general welfare, among other things-is 
particularly troubling in a post-9/11 world. 
Sanctuary laws seem especially hazardous in light of the broad 
trends-namely terrorism, crime, and illegal immigration-
significantly impacting today's society. First, with respect to 
terrorism, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
44. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cI. 2. 
45. The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison), http://thomas.loc.govlhomelhistdoxlfed_lO.html 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2006). 
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United States ("Commission"), in chilling detail, uncovered the many 
security-related failures of our immigration system before 9/11; the 
Commission consequently made immigration reform a dominant 
theme in its recommendations.46 Also, as journalist and author 
Michelle Malkin noted in her 2004 testimony before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee: 
More than half of the 48 Islamic radicals convicted 
or tied to recent terrorist plots in the United States over 
the past decade either were themselves illegal aliens or 
relied on illegals to get fake IDs. Immigration violators 
participated in the first attack on the World Trade 
Center, the Los Angeles Millenium bombing plot, and 
the New York subway bombing conspiracy. Three of 
the 9/11 hijackers were here illegally; two had previous 
immigration violations . . . Three 9/11 hijackers-
Mohammed Atta, Hani Hanjour, and Ziad Jarrah-
came into contact with state and local police before the 
attacks for speeding. Atta and Hanjour were visa 
violators.47 
In fact on September 9, 2001, a Maryland state trooper stopped 
9/11 hijacker Ziad Jarrah in rural Cecil County; the speeding ticket 
was later found in his rental car's glove compartment at Newark 
Airport.48 
Second, and beyond the terrorism context, sanctuary laws endanger 
Marylanders' domestic security by ignoring ever-rising immigration 
levels and crime, as well as their occasional intersection. Regarding 
immigration, the number of illegal aliens in Maryland doubled to 
250,000 between 2000 and 2004, according to the Pew Hispanic 
Center.49 The explosion of legal and illegal immigration in the state is 
46. Michael John Garcia and Ruth Ellen Wasem, 9/11 Commission: Current Legislative 
Proposals for U.S. Immigration Law and Policy, Congressional Research Service, I (Oct. 
18,2004) (Order Code RL32616). 
47. State and Local Authority to Enforce Immigration Law: Evaluating a United Approach 
for Stopping Terrorists, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, 
and Citizenship of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 108th Congo (April 22, 2004) 
(statement of Michelle Malkin). 
48. Sheila MacVicar and Caroline Faraj, September II Hijacker Questioned In January 2001, 
CNN, Aug. I, 2002, http://archives.cnn.comJ2002/US/08/01/cia.hijacker/index.html (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2006). 
49. Jeffrey S. Passel, Estimates of the Size and Characteristics of the Undocumented 
Population, Pew Hispanic Center, March 21, 2005, at 7; S.A. Miller, Ehrlich says 
Duncan wrong on illegal aliens; Calls rival's accepting attitude 'divergent', THE 
WASHINGTON TIMES, Aug. 19,2005, at AO!. 
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creating a major political issue in the run-up to the 2006 gubernatorial 
election. As CNN commentator Lou Dobbs observed, "the numbers 
have grown so fast [in Maryland], it's now shaping into a campaign 
theme.,,5o 
With respect to immigration and crime, illegal immigration has 
become the number one federal crime in the United States, with one-
third of federal prosecutions in Fiscal Year 2004 relating to 
immigration-the largest share of all such prosecutions. 51 The United 
States is also home to more than "400,000 alien absconders and more 
than 85,000 criminal illegal aliens," as Congressman Charles F. Bass 
noted on the House Floor last year. 52 
In sum, sanctuary ordinances, in addition to lacking valid legal 
justification, impede criminal justice and endanger Marylanders in a 
variety of ways. Given the interplay between terrorism, crime, and 
soaring immigration levels, an approach that brazenly ignores federal 
law and Congressional intent should not be tolerated, particularly with 
respect to security matters. Sanctuary laws should no longer be seen 
as the harmless political protest of a few "progressive" councils 
(Montgomery and Prince George's Counties together have 1.7 million 
people, while Baltimore City has 630,000),53 and it is imperative that 
these policies be abolished. 
III. ALTERNATIVES FOR ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM 
Various alternatives have been put forth, many in legislation 
introduced in Congress, for remedying the problem of sanctuary 
policies. Among these numerous suggestions are: 
50. Lou Dobbs, Lou Dobbs Tonight: Official English?; Terrorists Target Navy Ships; lllegal 
Aliens in Maryland; Merck Loses Vioxx Case; Secretary Rice Changes China Rhetoric; 
Safety vs. Privacy in Airports (Television Broadcast, Aug. 19, 2005), 
http://transcripts.cnn.comlTRANSCRIPTS/050SI19/ldt.01.html(last visited Jan. 28, 
2006). 
51. Le Templar, 1llegal Entry Tops Crime List, EAST VALLEY TRIBUNE, Aug. 24, 2005, 
http://www.eastvaUeytribune.comlindex.php?sty=4671O (last visited Jan. 27, 2006); 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Prosecution Of Immigration Cases Surge 
In U.S.; Sentences Slump; Massive Jump Found In One Judicial District (2005), at 
http://trac.syr.edultracins/latest/current/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2006). 
52. lSI Congo Rec. H 11956 (Dec. 16,2005) (statement of Rep. Bass). 
53. U.S. Bureau of the Census, State & County Quickfacts, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdlstates/24/24031.html(Montgomery County); 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdlstates/24/24033.html(Prince George's County); 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfdlstates/24/2404000.html(Baltimore City) (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2006). 
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First, Congress could withhold federal funds from local 
governments that refuse to enforce immigration law.54 
Second, the federal government, groups, or individuals could 
mount legal challenges in sanctuary cities, counties, or states. Fox 
News commentator Bill O'Reilly has suggested that "embarrassing 
lawsuits" against a locality and its officials might be effective as 
"[p ]olitical pressure does not seem to be working. ,,55 Interest groups 
such as the Friends of Immigration Law Enforcement (FILE) have 
been suing sanctuary localities for years.56 
Third, Congress could pass legislation-such as S.1438, the 
Comprehensive Enforcement and Immigration Reform Act of 2005-
clarifying that states possess 'inherent' authority to enforce federal 
immigration law; in such a measure, Congress could expressly declare 
that these sanctuary laws violate federallaw. 57 
Fourth, Congress more generally could enact legislation-such as 
H.R. 3137, the Clear Law Enforcement for Criminal Alien Removal 
(CLEAR) Act of 2005-to broaden the local role in immigration law 
enforcement in various ways. 58 
Also, Congress could pass legislation providing various kinds of 
immunities and reimbursement to localities assisting in enforcing 
federal immigration law.59 
IV. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES 
Regarding these various proposals, enacting federal legislation that 
would withhold funds from sanctuary cities and counties has the 
advantage of being a quick way to punish and deter defiant localities. 
Its disadvantages, however, are that it somewhat circumvents the fact 
that sanctuary policies are illegal, and it does not guarantee 
compliance. A worst-case scenario, moreover, is that such a policy 
54. BRUNO, supra note 7, at 5; See PHAM, supra note 21, at note 56 (observing that the 
CLEAR Act "requires states who receive federal reimbursement under section 24I(i) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act ... or who want to receive additional federal funds 
available under the CLEAR Act to pass laws pennitting local enforcement of 
immigration laws"). 
55. Bill O'Reilly, The O'Reilly Factor: Talking Points Memo and Top Story (Television 
Broadcast, Jan. 3, 2003). 
56. Jerry Seper, Illegal Criminal Aliens Abound in U.S., THE WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 26, 
2004, at AO 1. 
57. SEGHETTI, supra note 1, at 19. 
58. !d. 
59. BRUNO, supra note 7, at 5. 
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might endanger citizens by depriving a locality of needed homeland 
security funding that later experienced a terrorist attack. 
With respect to the notion of challenging sanctuary policies in 
court, this approach could provide a strong incentive for local officials 
to rethink and perhaps abolish their sanctuary policies, as some 
observers have noted. Such litigation would also enjoy extensive 
media coverage that could raise public awareness of the issue. Some 
disadvantages of this approach, however, are that it might be difficult 
to find plaintiffs with standing, and the possibility of a legal setback 
looms. 
As to the idea of federal legislation clarifying that states possess 
inherent authority to enforce immigration law, this approach would 
help clear up the significant confusion and onfc0ing academic debate 
as to whether states do possess this authority. 0 Mere statements on 
inherent authority and sanctuary laws' illegality, however, would be 
unlikely to prompt localities to abolish their sanctuary policies; such a 
statement would be more effective as part of a broader package. 
The various proposals to broaden local involvement in immigration 
matters could play a significant role in spurring localities to 
voluntarily enforce immigration law in concert with federal 
authorities. (These proposals, and their ramifications and 
justifications, are well beyond the scope of this paper.) As with 
declarations about states' inherent authority, however, they alone 
would probably not provide enough of a 'stick' to prompt localities to 
rethink or abolish their sanctuary laws. 
Finally, with regard to legislation providing various kinds of 
immunities and reimbursements to cooperative localities, such 
legislation would be helpful but should similarly be part of a broader 
package of reforms. One disadvantage is that these benefits to 
localities would still not get at the problem of existing sanctuary laws. 
In light of the strengths and weaknesses of these various proposals, 
the best approach would likely be to employ a patchwork of these 
suggestions: 
First, Congressional withholding of funds to sanctuary cities and 
counties could provide the strongest 'stick' to modify these localities' 
conduct. By depriving these cities of money, a local government's 
shrinking coffers might cause officials to rethink what is primarily 
political opposition to enforcing immigration law. 
60. See HETHMON, supra note 1, at 89-92. 
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Second, initiating litigation challenging a sanctuary policy is also 
advisable, particularly because the federal government would likely 
prevail on the merits in the vast majority of courts. These legal 
challenges could conceivably be brought by the federal government-
such as the Homeland Security Secretary or by the Attorney General-
by groups, or by a private citizen with standing.61 As to Maryland's 
sanctuary policies specifically, one could imagine that should such 
litigation reach the generally conservative Fourth Circuit, that court 
would reach a conclusion similar to that reached in City of New York. 
Further, should the issue of Maryland police enforcing federal 
immigration law arise in litigation, plaintiffs could rely on Department 
of Public Safety and Correctional Services v. Berg,62 where the Court 
of Appeals expressly held that "state and local law enforcement 
officials may appropriately enforce federallaw.,,63 
Third, Congress should pass a comprehensive package that: 
declares states' inherent authority and the illegality of sanctuary 
policies; provides various 'carrots' to reward cooperative local 
governments; and expands and encourages local immigration law 
enforcement. Increasing local involvement might help change the 
current, muddled paradigm in immigration law enforcement such that 
sanctuary cities would be viewed as tremendously unhelpful in the 
homeland security effort. Several bills currently pending in the I09th 
Congress would do many of these exact things.64 Legislative efforts in 
the Maryland General Assembly could complement Congress' 
objectives in this area as well. 
Finally, these efforts should be complemented by a well-organized 
lobbying effort, at both the so-called 'grassroots' and 'grasstops' 
levels, to influence the Maryland governments with sanctuary laws to 
repeal them. At the 'grassroots', this effort could involve, among 
other things, public opinion polling and airing local advertisements 
and editorials to gin up public support for eliminating sanctuary 
policies. At the 'grasstops', various organizations such as the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors, the National Association of Counties, and the 
National Governors' Association-along with state- and national-level 
criminal justice organizations such as the National Sheriffs' 
Association-should be enlisted in this effort, which should be 
coupled with pressure from state public officials. 
61. HETHMON, supra note 1 at 95-96. 
62. 342 Md. 126 (1996). 
63. Id. at 139. 
64. SEGHEITI, supra note 1, at 1. 
